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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did Petitioners reasonably interpret and rely

upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) when they filed consolidated
sales tax returns and disregarded intra-unit transfers of sand
and gravel.

The standard of review for this issue, which raises

questions of statutory interpretation, legislative intent and
construction of statutory language, is the correction of error
standard and this Court need not give any deference to the
Commission' s interpretation of the law.
46b-16(4)(d) (1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

See Savage Indus. , Inc. v. Utah Tax

Comm' n, 811 P. 2d 664, 668-70 (Utah 1991); Bevans v. Industrial
Comm' n. 790 P. 2d 573, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
(2)

Did the Tax Commission erroneously interpret and

apply Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 by assessing sales taxes solely
upon erroneous accounting records which failed to recognize that
Harper Contracting, Inc. , the alleged consumer of the gravel
materials, actually owned all rights title and interest in the
gravel materials.

The standard of review for this issue, which

raises questions of statutory interpretation, legislative intent
and construction of statutory language, is the correction of
error standard and this Court need not give any deference to the
Commission' s interpretation of the law.
-1-

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-16(4)(d) (1988).

See Savage Indus. , Inc. v. Utah Tax

Comm' n. 811 P. 2d 664, 668-70 (Utah 1991); Bevans v. Industrial
Comm' n. 790 P. 2d 573, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Each person receiving any payment or
consideration upon the sale of property or
service subject to the tax under this
chapter, or to whom such payment or
consideration is payable (hereinafter called
the vendor) is responsible for the
collection of the amount of the tax imposed
on the sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(1) (1986).

Each vendor shall, on or before the last
day of the month next succeeding each
calendar quarterly period, file with the
commission a return for the preceding
quarterly period. The return shall be
accompanied by a remittance of the amount of
tax required under this chapter to be
collected by the vendor for the period
covered by the return.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986).
(1) "Person" includes any individual,
firm, copartnership, joint adventure,
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group
or combination acting as a unit and the
plural as well as the singular number unless
the intention to give a more limited meaning
is disclosed by the context.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986).

"Vendor" means any person receiving any
payment or consideration upon a sale of
tangible personal property or any other
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-2-

12-103(1), or to whom such payment or
consideration is payable.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987).

(1) There is levied a tax on the
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible
personal property made within the state;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987).

"Retail sale" means any sale within the state of
tangible personal property or any other taxable item
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), other than
resale of such property, item, or service by a
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8)(a) (1987).
"Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or
barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner, of
tangible personal property or any other taxable item
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a
consideration.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The issue before this Court is whether a Utah taxpayer
can be forced to pay more than three-quarters of a million
dollars in sales taxes when it reasonably relied upon the plain
language of the tax statutes and when the assessment of sales
taxes is based solely upon a bookkeeper' s erroneous accounting
records which inaccurately reflect the transactions which they
purport to record.
-3-

Nature of the Case
This case arose when the Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission assessed nearly three-quarters of a million
dollars against Petitioners for failing to remit taxes on the
alleged sales of sand and gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to
Harper Contracting, Inc.

Petitioners disputed that any such

taxes were owing.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
In 1989, the Utah State Tax Commission issued certain
Preliminary Notices of assessment for audit periods ranging from
October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988.
On October 26, 1990, Petitioners filed a Petition for
Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission.

The matter

came on for hearing before the Commission on July 30, 1991.
On January 9, 1992, the Commission issued its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision affirming the
assessment of sales and use tax.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Reconsideration of
the Final Decision with the Tax Commission on May 4, 1992.
The Tax Commission denied Petitioners' Petition for
Reconsideration in an Order dated June 3, 1992.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of Agency
Action with this Court on July 1, 1992.

-4-

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Stipulation of Facts
1.

The parties stipulated to many of the pertinent

facts in this case in a Stipulation of Facts filed with the Tax
Commission on March 29, 1991, a copy of which is contained in
the addendum as "Exhibit A."

(R. 566-653)

The Reorganization of Harper Excavating, Inc.
2.

Prior to 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. operated a

business which included the excavation, cleaning and washing,
hauling, and laying of sand, gravel, and other materials.

(R.

208; Transcript at 6, 79)
3.

In 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. discovered that

it could not obtain sufficient liability insurance coverage for
its business.

(Transcript at 39-40, 45)

Therefore, the

decision was made to reorganize Harper Excavating, Inc. as a
means of protecting the assets of the organization.

(R. 568,

645)
4.

On or about May 10, 1986, pursuant to a certain

plan of reorganization, the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc.
(the name of which was subsequently changed to Harper
Investments, Inc. ) were divided and transferred to three wholly
owned subsidiaries - Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , Harper
Investments, Inc. (the name of which was subsequently changed to
Harper Excavating, Inc. ), and Harper Contracting, Inc.

-5-

(collectively referred to herein as the "subsidiaries").
(R. 208, 567)
5.

The name of Harper Excavating, Inc. , the Parent

Corporation of the three subsidiaries, was changed to Harper
Investments, Inc.
6.

(R. 208, 567)

Rulon Harper was the president of Harper

Excavating, Inc. before the reorganization, and became the
president of each Petitioner after the reorganization.

(R. 208-

0 9; Transcript at 20)
7.

Although the reorganization divided Harper

Excavating into three subsidiaries and a parent company, the
control and operations of the company did not change.

The

companies were presented to their customers as a single unit,
bid jobs in the same manner, worked together to accomplish the
goal of the affiliated group, were insured under a single policy
and obtained a single bonding.

(R. 646; Transcript at 23-25,

56, 106, 108)
The Accounting System for the Reorganized Companies
8.

The reorganization of Harper Excavating, Inc.

necessitated a very complicated accounting system and required
the redesigning of computer programs and accounting procedures
for identifying revenue and expenses by job, by gravel pit, by
labor, and by equipment.

Because many jobs would cut across two

or more of the operating corporations, income and expenses
needed to be allocated based upon contributions of the various
-6-

corporations.

Thus, income statements needed to be generated

for the consolidated entity, including all four corporations, by
each corporation, by job, by gravel pit, by equipment, and by
material type.
9.
notice.

(R. 568, 645-46; Transcript at 45-48)
The reorganization took place upon very short

Consequently, there was a very confusing period during

which the computer programs were developed and the flow of
information was accomplished.

In several instances, procedures

were begun and then modified or entirely changed as it became
apparent that they were not working in the new organization.
(R. 568, 645-46; Transcript at 51-52)
10.

The controller for Harper Excavating, Inc. prior

to and during its reorganization was Steven C. Goddard.

Goddard

was solely responsible for creating the accounting system and
procedures for the reorganized corporations.

(R. 208, 645;

Transcript at 43-46, 66-67, 78-79)
11.

In creating the accounting system and procedures

for the reorganized corporations, Goddard allocated balance
sheet assets and costs among the various subsidiaries in
accordance with the function of each subsidiary as he understood
those functions.

For internal cost allocation purposes, Goddard

assumed that the materials and costs associated with preparing
the sand and gravel should be allocated to Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc., that assets and costs of hauling the materials
should be allocated to Harper Excavating, Inc. , and that Harper
-7-

Contracting, Inc. should be allocated the assets and costs
associated with installing the materials.

He made the

allocations of balance sheet assets without consulting Rulon
Harper.

(R. 208-09, 646-47; Transcript at 73-74, 77-78, 83)
12.

Rulon Harper did not concern himself with the

accounting aspects of the reorganization.

He understood that

accounting transactions among the individual Petitioners were
necessary for book keeping purposes but had no effect on the
ultimate profit or losses of the companies as a unit.
Therefore, he did not scrutinize the accounting policies and
transactions instituted by the controllers for the Petitioners.
(Transcript at 24-25, 37-38, 59-63, 108)
The Gravel Sale Agreements
13.

On February 25, 1985, pursuant to certain Gravel

Sale Agreements, Harper Excavating, Inc. purchased from Rulon
Harper and other sellers all rights, title and interest in rock,
sand, dirt, gravel and other materials located in a number of
gravel pits.

The agreements are contained in the addendum at

"Exhibit A."

(R. 208, 566, 572-83, 587-58, 602-12, 616-27, 631-

41)
14.

Beginning in 1985, Rulon Harper recognized the

sale of sand and other pit materials as a sale of an interest in
real estate on Schedule D on his personal income tax returns.
(R. 567)
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15.

Contemporaneous with the reorganization, and

pursuant to certain Assignments of Gravel Sale Agreement dated
May 10, 1986 Harper Contracting, Inc. succeeded to the interest
of Harper Excavating, Inc. as buyer under the Gravel Sale
Agreements.
"Exhibit A."

The assignments are contained in the addendum at
(R. 208, 567, 584-85, 599-6000, 613-14, 628-29,

642-43)
16.

Prior to the reorganization, Goddard knew that

the Harper Excavating, Inc. was paying Rulon Hairper and others
for sand and gravel used in the company.

However, Goddard was

not aware of the Gravel Sale Agreements under which these
transactions were accomplished and was never informed that the
agreements were assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. after the
reorganization.
17.

(R. 646; Transcript at 48-49)
The materials subject to the Gravel Sale

Agreements were not carried as an asset on the books of Harper
Excavating, Inc. prior to the reorganization and, therefore,
Goddard did not specifically allocate interests in those
materials to a specific subsidiary.

However, consistent with

his theory of accounting after the reorganization, Goddard
mistakenly assigned the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc.

(R. 208-09, 646-47; Transcript at 48-50, 80-81,

83, 85-86)
18.

Goddard did not consult anyone concerning the

appropriate accounting procedure for handling sand and gravel
-9-

materials.

Moreover, Goddard did not discuss this procedure

with the owners and officers of any of the reorganized
corporations.
19.

(R. 647; Transcript at 46-47, 79)
Because Goddard had mistakenly assigned sand and

gravel materials to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , he assumed
that sand and gravel would be purchased by Harper Excavating,
Inc. and resold to Harper Contracting, Inc.

All of his

accounting procedures and records reflected this
misunderstanding of the nature of the transactions which were
occurring between the Petitioners.
20.

(R. 209)

If Goddard had known that the Gravel Sale

Agreements existed and became an asset of Harper Contracting,
Inc. after the reorganization, he would have allocated those
asset to Harper Contracting, Inc. and appropriately accounted
for the transfers of sand and gravel among the Petitioners.
(Transcript at 50-51, 57-58)
21.

Rulon Harper was unaware that Goddard had

assigned the sand and gravel materials to Harper Sand and
Gravel, Inc. and was also unaware that purchasing and accounting
procedures did not reflect the true and correct ownership of the
sand and gravel.

(R. 209)

Petitioners7 Post Reorganization Taxes
22.

After the reorganization, Goddard researched the

provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act to determine
appropriate tax and filing procedures for Petitioners.
-10-

He

concluded that, since Petitioners continued to operate in the
same manner as before the reorganization, they were a "group or
combination acting as a unit," and, therefore, a single "Person"
within the meaning of former section 59-15-2(1) of the Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act.

Consequently, Goddard filed consolidated

tax returns and did not treat intra-unit transfers as taxable
sales.

Goddard also received telephone confirmation from the

Tax Commission regarding the accuracy of those conclusions.
(R. 646; Transcript at 52-55, 95)
23.

In October of 1987, Steven Karsten became the

controller for Petitioners.

After observing the records and

actual operations of Petitioners, he concurred with the former
controller' s determinations regarding the taxability of
intercompany transactions and continued to file consolidated tax
returns.

(Transcript at 96-99, 101-102)
24.

After the reorganization, Petitioners hired an

independent CPA firm to perform audits and create consolidated
financial statements.

Those statements were based on Goddard' s

accounting journals and were used by the CPA firm to prepare the
Petitioners' consolidated income and sales tax returns.
(Transcript at 67-68, 112)
25.

Petitioners filed consolidated sales tax returns

and consolidated income tax returns for 1986 through September
of 1988.

During that time the Tax Commission never told

-11-

Petitioners that they could not file consolidated sales tax
returns.

(Transcript at 55, 98-99)
The Tax Commission Audit
26.

In the later part of 1988, Respondent conducted

an audit of Petitioners financial statements.

The auditors

relied solely upon the records and financial statements given to
them by the Petitioners' controller which did not include the
sand and gravel agreements.
27.

(R. 569; Transcript at 141-42)

In 1989, the Utah State Tax Commission issued

certain Preliminary Notices for audit periods ranging from
October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988.

The Auditing Division of

the Tax Commission assessed nearly three-quarters of a million
dollars of tax and interest against Harper Excavating, Inc. for
the alleged sales of sand, gravel and other materials from
Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper Contracting, Inc. during the
audit period.

(R. 209-10, 315-370)

Petitioners7 Restated Financial Statements
28.

Petitioners' independent CPA firm was informed

about the accounting errors with respect to the sand and gravel
sales.

As a result of this information, the CPA firm revised

its audit of Petitioners and restated the financial statements
to accurately reflect the true ownership of the sand and gravel
and to accurately reflect the true nature of the transactions
between Petitioners.

Those restated financial statements were

-12-

admitted as part of the record before the Tax Commission.
(Transcript at 83-84, 121-23; Exhibit 12)
29.

The restated financial statements and current

accounting documents show that Harper Contracting, Inc. owns the
Gravel Sale Agreements.

The documents reflect that Harper

Contracting, Inc. pays Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. a fee to
process the sand and gravel.

Harper Contracting, Inc. then pays

Harper Excavating, Inc. a fee to transport its sand and gravel
to the job site.

Harper Contracting, Inc. collects and remits

sales tax for ultimate sales to the consumer.

(Transcript at

117-18)
Petitioners7 Post Audit Tax Assessments
30.

Petitioners accounting records for 1/1/89 to

9/30/91, were audited by Respondent at the end of 1991.

That

audit did not result in any sales tax assessments for the sand
and gravel transactions between Petitioners which are now
accurately recorded in Petitioners' accounting records.

(R. 26)

Proceedings Before The Tax Commission
31.

On October 26, 1990, Petitioners filed a Petition

for Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission.

(R.

669-83)
32.

The issues for the Tax Commission to determine

were set forth in the Prehearing Order dated February 19, 1991,
contained in the addendum as "Exhibit B. "

-13-

(R. 657-60)

33.

The matter came on for hearing before the

Commission on July 30, 1991.
34.

(Transcript)

At the hearing, Burt Ashcroft, Respondent' s only

witness, acknowledged that a company cannot sell an asset which
it does not own.
35.

(Transcript at 141)

Burt Ashcroft also stated that he would have to

evaluate and re-examine the Petitioners' restated financial
statements in light of the assigned Gravel Sale Agreements in
order to determine whether or not his position would change with
regard to the sales taxes imposed.
36.

(Transcript at 144)

On January 9, 1992, the Commission issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision
affirming the assessment of sales and use tax, contained in the
addendum as "Exhibit C. »
37.

(R. 207-14)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Reconsideration

of the Final Decision with the Tax Commission on May 4, 1992.
(R. 11-19)
38.

The Tax Commission denied Petitioners' Petition

for Reconsideration in an Order dated June 3, 1992 on the basis
that "Petitioner presents no new or additional facts or
arguments that were not previously presented [and] considered
. . . "

A copy of the Commission' s Order is contained in the

Addendum as "Exhibit D. "
39.

(R. 8-10)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of Agency

Action with this Court on July 1, 1992.
-14-

(R. 2-4)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioners analyzed the provisions of the Utah Sales
and Use Tax Act and reasonably concluded that they were a "group
or combination acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act.
Therefore, they filed consolidated sales tax returns and did not
pay taxes on intra-unit transactions.

The Tax Commission

concluded, however, that although Petitioners are a unit for
purposes of filing consolidated sales tax returns, they are not
a unit when it comes to payment of sales tax on intra-unit
transactions.

Unlike the decision of the Tax Commission,

Petitioners' interpretation of the Act is reasonable, logical
and consistent.

Petitioners should not be penalized because

they acted upon their reasonable interpretation of the Act.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the Tax
Commission and order the Commission to refund the monies paid
under protest by Petitioners plus interest which has accrued on
that amount.
The Court need not address Petitioners7 second
argument unless it fails to rule in favor of Petitioners on
their first argument.

Even then, the Court must reverse the

decision of the Tax Commission because that decision fails to
recognize and assess taxes according to the realities in this
case.

It is undisputed that Harper Contracting, Inc. owned the

sand and gravel which Harper Excavating, Inc. purportedly sold

-15-

to it.

Therefore, the transactions which occurred between

those Petitioners could not have been sales within the meaning
of the Act and Petitioners' accounting records which
mischaracterized those transactions as sales were erroneous.
The Tax Commission should have relied upon the substance of the
transactions as disclosed by the actual facts rather than upon
form of the transactions as disclosed by Petitioners' inaccurate
and erroneous recording of those facts.

Therefore, the Court

must reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and order the
Commission to refund the monies paid under protest by
Petitioners plus interest which has accrued on that amount.
ARGUMENTS
I.

Petitioners Reasonably Interpreted and Relied
Upon S 59-15-2(1) of the Utah Sales And Use Tax
Act and, Therefore, Are Not Required To Pav Sales
Tax On Intra-Unit Transactions.

In 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. , the predecessor to
Petitioners, discovered that it was unable to obtain sufficient
liability insurance for its business activities.
39-40, 45)

(Transcript at

Consequently, the decision was made to reorganize

the business into smaller units to attempt to segregate risks
and to protect some of the assets of the business in the event
of a disaster.

(R. 568, 645; Transcript at 45)

Steven Goddard,

the controller for Harper Excavating, Inc. , was solely
responsible for setting up the accounting procedures and systems
for the reorganized business.

(R. 208, 645; Transcript at 43-16-

46, 66-67, 78-79)

During the reorganization, Goddard became

concerned about the appropriate tax treatment for the
reorganized business.

To resolve his concerns, Goddard

consulted the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act.

(R. 646; Transcript

at 52-55, 95)
Goddard discovered that, with respect to the
collection of sales taxes, the 1986 Sales and Use Tax Act
provided as follows:

"Each person receiving any payment or

consideration upon the sale of property or service subject to
the tax under this chapter . . .

is responsible for the

collection of the amount of the tax imposed on the sale. "
Code Ann. § 59-15-5(1) (1986) (emphasis added). 1

Utah

With respect

to the filing and payment of sales tax returns, Goddard was
instructed that "each vendor . . . shall file with the
commission a return for the preceding quarterly period.

The

return shall be accompanied by a remittance of the amount of tax
required under this chapter to be collected by the vendor for
the period covered by the return."

§ 59-15-5(4).2

1

In 1987, former section 59-15-5(1) was amended and
recodified.
From 1987-1990, the Sales and Use Tax Act stated:
11
Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales or use
tax imposed under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)
(1987) (emphasis added).
2

Subsequent to the 198 7 amendment, the Act provided that
" each vendor . . . shall file with the commission a return for the
preceding quarterly period. The return shall be accompanied by a
remittance of the amount of tax required under this chapter to be
collected or paid for the period covered by the return. " Utah
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Goddard then looked to the Act for clarification of
the terms and phrases used in the foregoing statutory
provisions.

Prior to the 1987 amendment, the Act defined the

term "person" as follows:
(1) " Pers on" i ncludes any i ndi vi dual,
firm, copartnership, joint adventure,
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group
or combination acting as a unit and the
plural as well as the singular number unless
the intention to give a more limited meaning
is disclosed by the context.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986) (emphasis added). 3

Prior

to 1987, the Sales and Use Tax Act did not define the term
"vendor."

However, in 1987 the following definition was added

to the Act:
(15) "Vendor" means any person receiving
any payment or consideration upon a sale of
tangible personal property or any other
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-

Code Ann. § 59-12-107(8) (1987) (emphasis added).
3

Since its
"person" as follows:

amendment

in

1987,

the

Act

has

(5) "Person" includes any individual,
firm,
partnership,
joint
venture,
association,
corporation,
estate, trust,
business trust, receiver, syndicate, this
state,
any
county,
city,
municipality,
district, or other local governmental entity
of the state, or any group or combination
acting as a unit.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) (1987) (emphasis added).
-18-

defined

12-103(1), or to whom such payment or
consideration is payable.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987) (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, the Act has never explained or defined the phrase
"group or combination acting as a unit" or any of the individual
words making up that phrase.
Goddard compared the foregoing tax provisions and
accompanying definitions with the following undisputed facts of
the reorganization.

(Transcript at 52-55)

Prior to its

reorganization, Harper Excavating, Inc. had been in the business
of excavating, cleaning and washing, hauling, and laying of
sand, gravel, and other materials for third parties.

(R. 208)

After its reorganization, the business, as reorganized,
continued under common ownership and control.

Though the

reorganization distributed assets, income and expenses among the
various Petitioners for accounting purposes, the day to day
operations of the business continued exactly as it had done
prior to the reorganization.

The Petitioners presented

themselves to the public as a unit, typically bid jobs as a
unit, and were each dependent upon the other for their
continuing operation.

(R. 646; Transcript at 23-25, 56, 106)

Petitioners prepared consolidated financial statements which
were necessary to win government contracts and to obtain
bonding.

(Transcript at 34, 104)

Petitioners were insured as a

unit under a single insurance policy and obtained a single
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bonding.

(Transcript at 34, 56, 108)

And finally, Goddard was

appropriately filing consolidated state and federal income tax
returns on behalf of the Petitioners.

(R. 646; Transcript at

55)
Based upon the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use
Tax Act and the facts of the reorganization, Goddard reasonably
concluded that Petitioners were a "group or combination acting
as a unit" within the clear language of the Act.

He confirmed

those conclusions in a telephone conversation with someone at
the Tax Commission.

(Transcript at 54-55, 95)

Pursuant to

former § 59-15-5(4), Goddard filed consolidated sales tax
returns on behalf of the Petitioners as a unit.

Based upon

former sections 59-15-5(1) and 59-15-5(4), Goddard continued to
collect and pay taxes on sales from the unit to its customers.
He did not collect and remit taxes on intra-unit transactions
because, as a "person" within the meaning of the Act, the unit
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obviously could not sell and purchase from itself.4

(R. 646;

Transcript at 52-55, 95)
Steven Karsten took over as controller of Petitioners
in 1987.

He assessed the accounting procedures previously

followed by Goddard and concurred with Goddard' s sales tax
treatment for Petitioners.

Therefore, Karsten continued the

practices established by Goddard.

(Transcript at 96-99, 101-

4

In its Final Decision, the Tax Commission makes the
following statement:
It is interesting to note that the parties
agree that had the interests in the gravel
pit in fact been assigned to Harper Sand and
Gravel as believed, then without question, a
taxable transaction would have arisen between
Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting.
Since this was indeed the belief that the
Petitioner' s controller was acting under,
sales tax should have been collected and
remitted throughout the audit period. This,
however, was not done and no explanation was
offered why it was not.
(R. 211) This statement of the Commission is incorrect for at
least three reasons. First, nowhere in their arguments to the Tax
Commission did Petitioners conceded that taxes would have been
owed to the state if the Gravel Sale Agreements had been assigned
to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.
Second, it is untrue that
Petitioners' controller was acting under this belief. Goddard was
unaware of the actual existence of the Gravel Sale Agreements, let
alone the fact that they had been assigned to Harper Contracting,
Inc. (Transcript at 48-49) Finally, a very poignant explanation
was provided to the Tax Commission for the decision not to pay
sales tax.
Petitioners always considered themselves to be a
"group or combination acting as a unit" within the clear meaning
of the Utah Sales and Tax Act. As a "person" within the meaning
of the Act, intra-unit sales were not taxable. Therefore, even if
Harper Sand and Gravel had been the actual owner of the sand and
gravel, no sales taxes would have been owed to the state.
-21-

102)

An independent CPA firm which audited the books of

Petitioners during the audit period and prepared Petitioners'
consolidated tax returns also concurred with Goddard' s
assessment of the tax provisions.

(Transcript at 67-68)

Moreover, for three years prior to the audit, the Tax Commission
itself never complained about Petitioners tax treatment which
always included the filing of consolidated income and sales tax
returns.

(Transcript at 55, 98-99)
It is well settled in Utah that "statutes imposing

taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority."

Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockavne,

22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P. 2d 97, 99 (1969).

Moreover, when the

meaning of a tax statute is uncertain, courts should resolve
those doubts in favor of the taxpayer.

Oaden Union Ry. and

Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm' n, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P. 2d 57, 61
(1964).

This Court recently affirmed its practice "to construe

taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it
to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive
if such intent exists."

Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm' n,

779 P. 2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989).
The Petitioners in this case reasonably interpreted
and relied upon the language of the Act.

As this Court has

recognized, "[t]he terms of a statute should be interpreted in
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accord with usually accepted meanings.

In construing

legislative enactments, the reviewer assumes that each term in
the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused
or inoperable. "

Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm' n, 811 P. 2d

664, 670 (Utah 1991).

Goddard followed this procedure.

He

examined the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act and
concluded that Petitioners were a "group or combination acting
as a unit" within the plain meaning of the Act.

Consequently,

he filed consolidated sales tax returns and disregard intra-unit
transactions for purposes of sales tax.

Others concurred with

Goddard7 s conclusions.
The Tax Commission, however, concluded that
Petitioners were required to pay sales tax on intra-unit
transactions.

The Commission disputed none of the evidence

which demonstrated that Petitioners were a "group or combination
acting as a unit," but nevertheless, held that because Harper
Excavating, Inc. reorganized into four separate corporations,
though for reasons wholly unrelated to tax, they were not a unit
for payment of sales tax.

The Final Decision of the Tax

Commission ignores the plain language of former section

59-15-

2(1) and current section 59-12-102(5) and gives contradictory
messages to taxpayers who must interpret the Act.
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It is imperative to note that, with respect to some
aspects of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, the Commission
conceded that Petitioners are in fact a "group or combination
acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act.

To illustrate

this fact, the Commission' s Prehearing Order identified the
following as an issue for the hearing:
A.
Were Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.,
Harper Excavating, Inc. , Harper Contracting,
Inc. , and Harper Investments, Inc.
collectively a "person" as that term is
defined in former Section 59-15-2(1) and new
Section 59-12-102(5) of the Utah Code
Annotated because they were a "group or
combination acting as a unit" and therefore
entitled to file a consolidated return?
(R. 657-58)

Curiously, the Commission answered this question

with the following statement:

"While the Petitioner mav indeed

have filed a consolidated sales tax return, it should have
reported the transactions between Harper Excavating and Harper
Contracting."
incongruous.

(R. 212) (emphasis added)

This statement is

On the one hand, the Tax Commission is conceding

that Petitioners are a unit for purposes of filing a
consolidated sales tax return.

In the same breath, however, the

Commission refuses to recognize Petitioners as a unit for the
payment of sales tax.

The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act makes no

distinction between "a unit" for filing of returns and "a unit"
for payment of sales tax and the Commission provides no
explanation for its distinction.
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Petitioners' interpretation of the Act gives meaning
and consistency to the "group or combination acting as a unit"
language of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act.

The decision of the

Tax Commission ignores this language and provides contradictory
messages to tax payers who ultimately must interpret and apply
the Act.

Because of that decision, Petitioners were required to

pay over five hundred thousand dollars in back taxes and over
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in interest.

As

predicted in the hearing before the Tax Commission, the payment
of these sums has been extremely damaging to Petitioners current
operations.

(Transcript at 108-09)

This Court should liberally

construe the statute in favor of Petitioners, reverse the
decision of the Tax Commission, and let the legislature clarify
the meaning of the statute if, in fact, Petitioners'
interpretation of the act was incorrect.

Salt Lake County, 779

P. 2d at 1132.
II.

Even Assuming Intra-Unit Sales Could Be Taxed, No
Sales Occurred In This Case.

If the Court finds that Petitioners' reasonably
interpreted and relied upon the language of the Sales and Use
Tax Act, it need not decide this second issue in the case.
However, if the Court concludes that Petitioners were not
reasonable in their interpretation of the Act, the Court should,
nevertheless, reverse the decision of the Tax Commission because
the Commission disregarded the facts of the case and affirmed
-25-

the sales taxes solely upon Petitioners' controller' s erroneous
accounting procedures.
The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act provides:

"There is

levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
. . . retail sales of tangible personal property made within the
state."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987) (emphasis added).

5

The Act defines "Retail sale" as "any sale within the state of
tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service
. . . by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. "
12-102(8)(a).6

§ 59-

The act defines "sale" in pertinent part to

mean "any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional or
otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any
other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for
a consideration."

§ 59-12-102(10).7

The Sales and Use Tax Act was amended and recodified in
1987. Prior to that time, the Act provided: "There is levied and
there shall be collected and paid . . . a tax upon every retail
sale of tangible personal property made within the state of Utah. "
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (1986) (emphasis added).
6

Prior to 1987, the Act provided: " x Retail sale' means
every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to
a user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(6) (1986).
7

Prior to its

amendment in 1987, the Act provided as

follows:
(2) "Sale"
or
"Sales"
includes
installment and credit sales, every closed
transaction constituting a sale, and also
includes the sale of electrical energy, gas,
services or entertainment taxable under the
terms of this act. A transaction whereby the
-26-

Under the authority of the foregoing statutory
provisions, Respondent assessed nearly three quarters of one
million dollars against Petitioners for unpaid sales taxes.

The

taxes were based solely upon the book entry sales of sand and
gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper Contracting, Inc.
(R. 569; Transcript at 141-42)

The Commission affirmed this

assessment without regard to the underlying facts upon which
those records were supposed to be based.
The facts underlying the alleged sand and gravel sales
are not disputed.

In February of 1985, Harper Excavating, Inc.

executed Gravel Sale Agreements with Rulon Harper, the president
of Harper Excavating, Inc.

Pursuant to those agreements, Harper

Excavating, Inc. purchased all rights title and interest to
certain materials located in several gravel pits owned by Rulon
Harper.

(R. 208)

When Harper Excavating, Inc. reorganized, its

Gravel Sale Agreements were assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc.

possession of property is transferred but the
seller retains the title as security for the
payment of the price shall be deemed a sale.
An even exchange
of tangible
personal
properties shall not be deemed a sale for
purposes of this act, but in any transaction
wherein tangible personal property is taken
as part of the sales price of other tangible
personal property, the balance valued in
money or other consideration shall be deemed
a sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(2) (1986).
-27-

which, thereafter, remained the owner of those Gravel Sale
Agreements.

(R. 208)

Steven Goddard was controller of Petitioners before
and after the reorganization and was solely responsible for
establishing and operating all of the accounting systems and
procedures for the newly organized corporations.

(R. 208, 645)

In developing those systems and procedures, Goddard allocated
and assigned the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. to each of
the newly formed subsidiaries.

(R. 208)

For allocation

purposes, Goddard assumed that the materials and costs
associated with preparing sand and gravel should be allocated to
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , that assets and costs of hauling
the materials should be allocated to Harper Excavating, Inc.,
and that Harper Contracting, Inc. should be allocated the assets
and costs associated with installing the materials.
Transcript at 73-74, 77-78)

(R. 647;

Consistent with Goddard's theory of

accounting after the reorganization, Goddard mistakenly assigned
the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.
208-09)

(R.

Goddard did not know that these assets had actually

been assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. and never consulted
Rulon Harper regarding the appropriate allocation of the company
assets.

(R. 208-09; transcript at 77-78)
All of Goddard' s subsequent accounting with respect to

the sand and gravel was based upon his erroneous assignment of
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those assets to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.

(R. 209)

Rulon

Harper was not aware of Goddard' s misassignment of the sand and
gravel assets and was also not aware that Goddard' s accounting
records and procedures did not reflect the true ownership of the
gravel pit materials.

(R. 209)

Petitioners did not discover

the accounting discrepancies until Respondent' s audit in 1988.
As a result of the audit, Petitioners caused their financial
statements to be restated to accurately reflect the ownership of
sand and gravel as well as the true nature of the transactions
among the Petitioners.

(Transcript at 83-84, 121-23; Exhibit

12)
It is undisputed that Respondent' s audit, which
supports the assessment of the sales tax, was based solely upon
Petitioners' erroneous accounting records.
transcript at 141-42)

(R. 209-10, 315-370;

Therefore, in the hearing before the Tax

Commission, Petitioners argued that the Commission must
recognize the actual ownership of the sand and gravel materials
and base its decision upon the true nature of the transactions
which occurred between the Petitioners.8

To assist the Tax

The Tax Commission apparently failed to understand the
substance of Petitioners' argument. In its Final Decision, the
Commission stated:
In the present case, the Petitioner argued
that one must look past the actual operation
of the companies involved and practices in
which they engaged, and look to where the
legal ownership of the property in question
-29-

Commission, Petitioner submitted their restated financial
statements to the Tax Commission.

Those restated financials

accurately reflected the true nature of the transactions between
Petitioners.

Significantly, Respondent' s only witness at the

hearing indicated that the restated financials could possibly
lead him to a different conclusion regarding the sales tax
imposed.

(Transcript at 144)

In its Final Decision, however,

the Tax Commission ignored Petitioners restated financial
statements and affirmed the tax assessment against Petitioners.
(R. 207-14)
The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act does not specifically
address the problem which exists in this case where the records
of the taxpayer incorrectly record sales of personal property
which have not in fact occurred.

Therefore, this Court must

actually laid. . . . The Commission does not
accept
Petitioner' s
argument
that
the
relationship of the three companies with
respect to one another and the proper
allocation of their assets determines sales
tax liability without regard to the manner in
which the assets were allocated (albeit in
error) by the controller and the subsequent
dealings between the companies as actually
practiced.
(R. 211)
These statements misstate Petitioners' arguments.
Petitioners never asked the Commission to look past their actual
operations, but rather to look t& their actual operations and not
to the erroneous accounting methods which purported to reflect
those operations.
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look to the legislative intent behind the statute.

As this

court has recently recognized, the
primary responsibility in construing
legislative enactments is to give effect to
the legislature's underlying intent. "In
determining the legislative intent of a
statute, the statute should be considered
in the light of the purpose it was designed
to serve and so applied as to carry out that
purpose if it can be done consistent with
its language. ' "
Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm' n, 811 P. 2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991)
(quoting Utah Power & Light v. Municipal Power Sys.. 784 P.2d
137, 141 (Utah 1989) (quoting Johnson v. State Tax Comm' n, 17
Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1977)).
The purpose of the Sales and Use Tax Act is clearly to
tax actual sales that occur within the state.
§ 59-12-103 (1987).

Utah Code Ann.

The Tax Commission cannot seriously argue

that the legislature intended taxes to be assessed on erroneous
accounting records which fail to reflect the realities of the
underlying transactions.

As the United States Supreme Court has

recognized, a taxpayers accounting records "are no more than
evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive.
[tax] decision must rest upon actual facts."

The

Doyle v. Mitchell

Bros, Co. . 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1917).
No Utah courts have addressed the issue being
presented in this case.

However, numerous courts from other

jurisdictions have recognized that accounting records merely
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record facts, they do not create the facts.

See, e. a. , Welp v.

United States, 201 F. 2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1953);
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Huston, 126 F. 2d 196,
199 (8th Cir. 1942); Sitterdina v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 939,
940-41 (4th Cir. 1936).

These courts reason, therefore, that

taxes must be imposed upon actual facts and not upon erroneous
accounting records.

See, e. a. , Chicago, Burlington & Ouincy

R. R. Co. v. United States, 455 F. 2d 993, 1016 (Ct. CI. 1972),
rev / d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973); Welp. 201 F. 2d at
131; Northwestern States Portland Cement, 126 F. 2d at 199;
Sitterding, 80 F. 2d at 941; Commissioner v. North Jersey Title
Ins. Co. , 79 F. 2d 492, 493 (3rd Cir. 1935); Wood v.
Commissioner, 93 T. C. 114, 120 (1989); Loftis v. Commissioner, 6
B. T. A. 725, 728 (1927).
There are obvious public policy reasons for requiring
the Tax Commission to assess taxes upon underlying facts rather
than upon erroneous accounting records and procedures.

If

accounting records and procedures determined a person' s tax
liability, taxpayers would be encouraged to create an accounting
method and paper trail which would result in favorable tax
assessments despite the legal, jural or other actual operations
of the taxpayer.

A taxpayer' s incorrect accounting records and

procedures will obviously not preclude the government from
collecting its revenues.

Sitterding. 80 F. 2d at 941.
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By the

same token, the taxpayer should not be bound by erroneous
records and procedures which suggest a tax liability that does
not otherwise exist.

Id.

Contrary to the decision of the Tax Commission,
Petitioners did nothing which warranted a tax in this case.

In

fact, they conveyed title to the materials to Harper
Contracting, Inc. specifically to avoid even the potential for
any such tax.

The mistake, in this case, was made by the

controller who was unaware of the realities of the situation.
When the mistake was discovered, Petitioners restated their
financial records so that they accurately reflected the
underlying transactions. 9

The decision of the Tax Commission

should have been based upon the facts as accurately reflected in
Petitioners restated financial statements because the
legislature intended to tax actual sales rather than inaccurate
records of non-existent sales.

Therefore, this Court should

reverse the decision of the Tax Commission.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners analyzed the provisions of the Utah Sales
and Use Tax Act and reasonably concluded that they were a "group

It is significant to note that Respondent audited
Petitioners' accounting records for the period 1/1/89 to 9/30/91.
Those records accurately reflect the transactions which have
continued to occur between Petitioners since they were reorganized
in May of 1986.
Respondent' s audit did not result in any
assessment of sales tax for the sand and gravel transactions
between Petitioners.
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or combination acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act.
Therefore, they filed consolidated tax returns eliminating
intra-unit accounting entries.

The Tax Commission concluded,

however, that although Petitioners were a unit for purposes of
filing consolidated sales tax returns under the Utah Sales and
Use Tax Act, that status did not entitle them to disregard
intra-unit transactions for payment of sales tax.

Unlike the

decision of the Tax Commission, Petitioners' interpretation of
the Act is reasonable, logical and provides a consistent
application to the phrase "group or combination acting as a
unit. "

Petitioners should not be penalized because they acted

upon their reasonable interpretation of the Act.

Consequently,

this Court should reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and
order the Commission to refund the amounts paid by Petitioners
under protest plus the interest that has accrued thereon.
The Court need not address Petitioners second argument
unless it fails to rule in Petitioners' favor on their first
argument.

Even then, the Court must reverse the decision of the

Tax Commission because it fails to recognize and assess taxes
according to the facts in this case.

It is undisputed that

Harper Contracting, Inc. owned the sand and gravel which was
transferred to it from Harper Excavating, Inc.

Therefore, the

transactions which occurred between those Petitioners could not
have been sales within the meaning of the Utah Sales and Use Tax
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Act and Petitioners' accounting records which mis characterized
those transactions as sales were erroneous.

The Tax Commission

should have relied upon the actual facts rather than upon the
Petitioners' erroneous recording of those facts.

Therefore, the

Court must reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and order
the Commission to refund the amounts paid by Petitioners under
protest plus the interest that has accrued thereon.
DATED this

L

day October, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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